

Intra-Regional Mobilities, Seething Xenophobia And Grassroots Pan-Africanism: Implications For Ghana-Nigeria Relations

By

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Abstract

In this paper, we explore the origins and implications of seething xenophobia arising out of intra-regional migrations in West Africa as they impact on Ghana-Nigerian relations within the set context of Grassroots Pan-Africanism. We observe that grassroots migrations within the West African sub-region mount informal pressures on the micro-States for the integration of the entire region. These pressures are reflected in formal State policies for such integration. We trace the slow pace of policy implementation at such formal levels to a contradictory process of grassroots tolerance and anxieties towards migrants in the sub-region. We embark on this within the framework of developing class and historic ethnocentric dynamics whereby the ruling classes instrumentally and instinctively uphold and defend the continued existence of these unviable micro-States in their own interest. These informal and formal processes are viewed within the larger spectrum of trans-continental grassroots migrations powered by class and ethnic

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dynamics within and across the micro-States in Africa – in effect, Grassroots Pan-Africanism. References to emigration from the sub-region are only tangential. In all this, we are focused on the pedagogical significance of immigration and emigration within the sub-region as manifested in grassroots movements among West African States in the process of their integration. Clearly, a political economy perspective is employed to bring out the complexities of the xenophobic problematic and its implications involved in such an African process of integration.

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Introduction

Despite the fact that the natural movement of persons, responding to economic and other pressures, remains a historical and contemporary reality in West Africa, migration has not always been spontaneous or freely-willed. Persons in their hundreds of thousands have relatively recently been forced to move from



one country to their country of origin within the region.ⁱ The chronology of such forced movements begins with the 1964 expulsions in Côte D'Ivoire. This was followed by the Ghana expulsions in 1969 which preceded those in Nigeria in 1983 and 1985 as well as the 1989 expulsions in Mauritania and Senegal; not to forget the expulsions in Benin in 1998. From the end of 1999, massive populations had to flee from Côte D'Ivoire upon feeling threatened. That is to say that in spite of the pronouncement of an *ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, the Right of Residence and Establishment* in 1979, the expulsions of the 1980s and 1990s took place.ⁱⁱ In the light of on-going developments in Ghana and Nigeria anxieties about threat of expulsion loom.

In the wake of the publication of a Ghanaweb.com feature article *Ghana: The 37th State of Nigeria in the Making?* (September 8 2017) by Ogyam Mensah, we observe contradictions in grassroots reactions on Nigerian presence in Ghana. Although the article spots features of a contrivance we

see in its very contrivance a reflection of a resurging trend that faces opposition in grassroots counter-trends. The re-emergence in political power of the regime that executed the *1969 Aliens Compliance Order* in Ghana appears to suggest to certain minds behind that trend that an opportunity for its repetition, rather than resort to more informed and durable measures directed at the process of regional and continental integration, exists. We observe in the counter-trends an accommodating attitude toward immigrants in general. This disposition, it seems it us, has facilitated the flouting of the land tenure system by chiefs in selling off communal land to immigrants to the discomfiture of the populace.ⁱⁱⁱ

Such are the contradictory vibrations in the West African polity that appear to us to slow down a consistent and enthusiastic observance of the



ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, the Right of Residence and Establishment – that is, a grassroots *accommodating attitude* towards immigrants and

their contradictory *anxious embarrassment* by immigrants' permanent acquisition of land through its purchase from chiefs in contravention of customary practice. Within this contradictory process we observe the central role of the growing indigenous middle classes of that entire polity in competition with each other. That competition appears to be without reference to the aspirations of indigenous persons displaced from the land

and who are, thereby, mobilized to settle such *intra*-middle-class struggles through appeals to 'national' sentiments rather than to the local grassroots grievances in the *inter*-class struggles.

We deem it important in this regard to place such regional developments within the context of transcontinental migrations in Africa. For, the movement of capital in Sub-Saharan Africa from Southern Africa to West Africa and *vice versa* occasions labour migrations such that banks and other enterprises are immediately identified with 'nationals' of the countries of origin of such capital. Hence, we hear of a 'Nigerian' or a 'South African' company in Ghana, for instance. Meanwhile, the Ecobank, with its officials being mainly of an indigenous extraction in the respective countries, for example, projects itself not as a regional entity but as a Pan-African phenomenon and is perceived as such by its clientele and beyond. These perceptions of 'national' and Pan-African formal entrepreneurial existences create a mass consciousness of possibilities for residence in other countries in pursuit of grassroots economic endeavours.

In this regard, we observe as limited in scope the general tendency in studies of migrations in West Africa to focus only on movements *within* the region and *to* northwards regions. For, the configurations of the West African political economy in its dynamics are better appreciated within the Pan-African framework which has the historical practice of free movement and integration of persons across the continent in States and Empires as

its natural surge. This suggests that the imposition of imaginary boundaries on the African landscape, by itself, injects tensions on the continent as a matter of course in the face of historical pressures to disregard those boundaries which are mostly indiscernible.^{iv} Persons might have their homes on one side of a border while they have their farms or workplaces on the other. Such persons of the same stock get pressured to identify each other with tags as different 'nationalities'.

In this study, our anxiety is well directed at unearthing the pedagogical significance of the schizophrenic embrace of *affection* and *suspicion* towards persons of different ethnicities but of the same stock as Africans. The question of how to derive knowledge of Africanness from persons at the grassroots of African society and impart same to them arises in our endeavour. The answer to that question is directed at informing policy-makers on how to accelerate the process of regional integration within the conscious framework of building Pan-Africanism from the grassroots of African society; so that the proclivities of the informal actor in African society arrest our focus and constitute the bedrock of the analysis of integration processes in Africa. The generation and application of such knowledge, we anticipate, shall be in democratic counter-valence to tendencies of imposition of policies that result in quiet resistance.

African leaders, both elected and self-imposed, have severally stated that it is difficult ruling the African. A possible response is: the African does not

seek to be ruled but seeks to rule self in a process that relies on their proclivities occasioned by their material circumstances and cultures historically derived from such circumstances; schemes that run counter to their proclivities are hence resisted in either a spirit of quiet or serene resistance or in overt acts of physical deconstruction of such self-presumptuous schemes. Africans verily seek self-rule and development in the exact senses of the terms and nothing less. In what follows, we address Ghano-Nigerian relations within the framework of the historical tendencies alluded to in the Pan-African context in its formal and informal scopes^v; that is, where 'formal' relates to State policy directives and implementation and 'informal', on the other hand, relates to extra-state *spontaneous* acts of behaviour.^{vi}

1

Formal and Informal Pan-Africanism

We understand *formal* Pan-Africanism to constitute in the series of organized meetings and conferences held in enclosed spaces to formulate programmes, policies and declarations to guide processes for the formal and practical integration of the people of the African continent and their Diaspora. This formality involves persons with backgrounds of learning in academic institutions or elsewhere. We differentiate this from the *informal* practice of persons, with or without formal education, who

spontaneously pursue their personal or corporate interests without *consciously* addressing themselves to the processes of Pan-Africanism although by their activities they necessarily contribute to those processes without formality. This latter is here referred to as *informal* or Grassroots Pan-Africanism. Our consideration is that the dialectic of these *two* currents in essence defines Pan-Africanism organically.

Grassroots Pan-Africanism predates formal Pan-Africanism. Literature on migration in Africa is replete with references to unimpeded movements of persons across the African landscape and through populated spaces. This has historically been observed as taking place in spite of the emerging nation-states and empires during and after the pre-colonial era. In our considerations of such movements it is clear to us that their configurations and contents have undergone qualitative variations. Thus, apart from peasants and persons engaged in animal husbandry there had been commodity peddlers who carried their wares from one village to the other far away from their country of origin; but this changed qualitatively such that businessmen have emerged who originate from one country but run huge stable enterprises in other countries.^{vii}

This perspective of Grassroots Pan-Africanism that exhibits the play of individuals, enterprises and banking institutions across borders in West African sub-regional trading – with special reference to Ghana-Nigerian relations – focuses on continental activities such that Diasporian efforts

are considered as integral to them only as they manifest within them. That suggests that there is, for instance, African-American presence, like the Kokrobite Institute in Ghana, in the economic activities that has relevance to the general framework of an integrating Africa. This is where we distinguish *between* Grassroots Pan-Africanism as an *informal* surge of a set of economic and trading activities with implications bearing on the political integration of the continent *and* formal Pan-Africanism which involves State and organized programmes directed at such integration. The Pan-African Congresses, the OAU/AU and ECOWAS as well as its likes on the continent express the latter.

In this paper, therefore, we intend exploring the difficulties and opportunities of the *convergence* of informal and formal Pan-Africanism as exhibited by the processes they represent on the ground and at State levels, respectively. The relations between Ghana and Nigeria, as the main sub-regional players, provide us with a case study of those difficulties and opportunities in terms of the dynamics of their emergence. Such a case study is well appreciated *within* the framework of the general character of *capital* movements on the continent. It is in that respect that we briefly map up in the next section the said general movements in abstraction not only to guide our detailing of the concrete activities but more importantly to better appreciate the concrete West African developments as integrated in and reflective of the continental processes.

2

The Character of Intra-Continental Capital Movements in Africa

The movement of capital in Africa portrays trajectories from the *southern* and *northern* tips of the continent toward the *centre* made up of countries to the north of the Republic of South Africa (RSA) and in East, Central, and West Africa – Sub-Saharan Africa in general. Hence, from the RSA capital takes routes northward while from Morocco capital dives southward. An additional movement of capital proceeds from Nigeria to its western neighbours and in an easterly southern direction to the RSA and eastern Africa. Morocco maintains contacts with the European Union (EU) and the Middle East although it decelerates its investments in the EU. In terms of countries of *initial preference*, RSA capital moves to Anglophone and Lusophone countries. Moroccan capital makes its moves to the Francophone countries. Nigerian capital, with the scale tilting slightly in favour of the Anglophone, is also present in the Francophones.

These trajectories map up a developing *intra-Africa* network of trade and industry with Morocco, South Africa and Nigeria being the main players. In this respect, Morocco takes the leading position and South Africa follows as the runners-up. This development retains the position of Western Europe and the United States of America as the traditional dealers with Africa in commodities and the mining industry. Hence, we

observe that whereas the West tends to concentrate on the extractive industries and trade in its commodities the African giants are not only involved in diverse economic activities but more importantly undertake and finance infrastructural development of the continent even if that means doing so in an uncoordinated manner outside a development plan for Africa. This is a situation that shows the African players in competition with each other. Small capital imitates this.

It is such competition in cross-continental and national development of capital as well as its movements in Africa that originates and fosters xenophobic reactions on the continent. A study of xenophobia in Africa, thus, calls for a study of the essential development and movement of capital in its internal contradictoriness pertaining to its non-antagonistic dimension across Africa. Xenophobic altercations in the relations of African countries, such as those between Ghana and Nigeria as well as between Nigeria and South Africa, are reflective of that general dynamic in the development of capital in Africa.

3

Trade and Industry in Ghano-Nigerian Relations

In his article *Top Nigerians Ruling Ghana Economically*, Akpah Prince draws a tall list of well qualified and formidable Nigerian business persons

engaged in Ghana and states that 'in fact Nigerians are rated third biggest investors on (sic) the Ghanaian economy.'^{viii} He states that by a research he conducted on heads of both Ghanaian and multinational institutions operating in Ghana he found 'that most of these institutions are being managed by foreigners with Nigerians being the majority where Ghanaians are assigned to the deputies and assistant positions'. Such entities, according to him, are 'various financial institutions, oil companies, insurance companies and other big multinational institutions managing and controlling the economy of Ghana.' The Nigerians actually *own* them. It is from this perspective that Ogyam Mensah entitles his article with the question '*Ghana: The 37th State of Nigeria in the Making?*'

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This movement of capital from Nigeria to Ghana is explained in terms of the higher cost of doing business in Nigeria.^x With a population of 187 million, Nigeria has 37 banks while Ghana has 31 banks with a population of 27 million.^{xi} In his article *Proliferation of Nigerian Banks*



into Ghana Worrying, Joseph Kobla Wemakor states that a major factor that has attracted Nigerian capital to Ghana is 'the relatively high minimum Capital requirement needed to invest in the banking sector in Nigeria. Since it was difficult to raise such capital, investors in Nigeria

found Ghana an attractive location to direct their capital and into an industry which is highly attractive.^{xii} Preceding that publication, in 2008 the article *Nigerian Banks Find Doing Business In Ghana Good To Resist* was published in the State newspaper *Daily Graphic*.^{xiii} The article is definite that such banks 'are leading brand names in Nigeria; mostly in the top 10 bracket.'^{xiv}

Moving alongside such huge Nigerian capital inflows to Ghana are similar but smaller inflows of Nigerian origin. These range from medium size wholesalers and small distributors to barbers and roadside dealers in musical end-uses like cassettes and DVDs. The Nigerian banks followed on the tails of the Nigerian enterprises to finance their activities either as on-going customers while in Nigeria or new ones in Ghana. It is in this light that Nigeria-led Ecobank was specifically founded to service trading in West Africa. It has since developed as a Pan-African bank in Sub-Saharan Africa with presence in 36 African countries.^{xv} Insofar as the activities of the enterprises and banks are *not immediately* projected in the schemes of Pan-Africanism but impact on informal pressures for a united Africa they are considered here as elements of Grassroots Pan-Africanism. In response to such pressures the referenced ECOWAS Protocol emerged.

It is interesting that as late as February 2016 the B&FT Online reports that although Ghana remains Nigeria's largest trade partner and favourite investment hub in West Africa, with Ghana importing 'the largest share of

all Nigerian oil exports in the West African sub-region', Nigeria has an 'Import Prohibition List' that restricts the movement of Ghanaian industrial goods into Nigeria. For instance, although Nigeria's Dangote Cement exports thousands of tonnage of cement into Ghana per annum the import of cement into Nigeria is on the Import Prohibition List. Against this development, the Association of Ghana Industries (AGI) mounts pressures on the Government of Ghana to adopt a 'close-up policy to make Nigeria open-up'. In response, the President of Ghana at the time appealed to Nigeria to 'learn to compete with Ghana', saying that 'I think that it'll make our two countries stronger'.^{xvi}

It is important to notice that the Ghanaian industrialists urge the Government of Ghana, according to the report, to have its Ministry of Trade and Industry take up the matter and ensure that 'the ECOWAS protocols are not limited to the free movement of *persons*, as they are doing now: *even more important for us is the goods and services.*' For, though the addition of goods and services expands the definition of 'movement' in ECOWAS lexicon, this shows that the free movement of *persons*, their residence and establishment in respective countries are on the lower scale of concerns to the industrialists. Yet they have their residential representatives in Nigeria who enhance the interaction of Ghanaians and Nigerians towards regional and continental integration. In that spirit, though such industrial concerns are *not consciously* projected

within the integration process they feature in it as informal (Grassroots) Pan-Africanism.

This intra-middle class competition to have access to the market of each other's country is a replication of the cross-continental occurrence where Nigerian-South African relations exhibit similar problematics with Nigeria being at the receiving end. Hence, in their relations with South Africa after 1994 Nigerian industrialists complain against South African restrictions on the movement of Nigerian capital into South Africa in a situation where South African capital in Nigeria is massive and keeps on increasing.^{xvii} Just as Nigerian policy of restrictions on exports into Nigeria creates restraints on industrial production in Ghana so does South African practice create difficulties for Nigerian industrial expansion. And just as Nigerian capital is encouraged by moments of liberalism and creation of a climate to attract capital into Ghana so is South African capital cheered by prospects offered by Nigeria's huge population.^{xviii}

We are thus presented with an overall African panorama of relative huge capital movement from South Africa and Nigeria to spaces of opportunity across the continent for the development and enhancement of 'national capital'. And this is not as if Nigeria and South Africa enjoy full development of their respective infrastructure and opportunities for their populations in their generality. It is a simple matter of corporate entities moving capital to where *profit* can be maximized either in the short or

long run. In this respect, it is important to observe the mitigating circumstance that South African capital tends to take the risk of developing such *infrastructure* in the host country as might assist its own growth whereas Nigerian capital tends to rely on existing facilities provided by the host country. This propensity of Nigerian capital very well denies even Nigeria of private direct investment in *infrastructural* development – that is, not to talk about such investment in *host* countries.

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If these movements of *upper* middle-class capital consciously mount pressures for the opening up of the economies of African countries for the mutual benefit of the African middle-classes so do movements of *lower* middle-class capital from one African country to others unconsciously mount pressures for the same effect in their seizing of opportunities to reside and establish in the host countries. In Ghana, Nigerian traders set up small business enterprises as they do in other West African countries as well as South Africa. The reciprocal is the case with Ghanaians establishing small-scale business enterprises in Nigeria. A Nigerian advertising article on business opportunities for Nigerians, like bread baking, in Ghana graphically tells the story of Nigerian influx into Ghana. Under the caption *Doing Business in Ghana as a Nigerian – Register your company in 8 days* we find this:

Ghana Business Opportunities for Nigerians

Do you want to expand your business to another country? Or you just want to know the business opportunities for Nigerians in Ghana? Or you want to incorporate your business in Ghana as a Nigerian but do not know what to do? Or you just want to own your own bank account in Ghana and do legitimate business? Or you just want to travel to Ghana for business and/or fun? Or you just want to relocate to Ghana and then run business to and from Nigeria? Then read on as this is for you. Or maybe you want to know how to buy a land or house in Ghana. Then you are at the right place.

Nigeria and Ghana are the closest of all countries in the world. They are the two closest English speaking countries and a lot of Nigerians visit Ghana for trade and business opportunities each day by air and road. This accounts for why vehicles that move in-between these countries with human and material goods are on the increase. This is your time to take advantages.

There are practically vast business opportunities for Nigerians in Ghana, the gold coast country of West Africa. Ghana has a pride of place in West Africa as gateway to other

West African countries as expatriates troop there for business too because of the peaceful nature and stable democracy there.

Unknown to many, hardworking Nigerians are making good business to-and-from Ghana...^{xx}

This increasing scale of Nigerian small capital investment in trade and industry in Ghana has already encountered a reaction from the Ghana Union of Traders' Association (GUTA) in the Ashanti Region of Ghana. In its denial that Ghanaians wanted or threatened to attack and forcibly takeover Nigerian businesses, GUTA explained that all it wanted was to get the authorities to ensure adherence to the law that restricts retail trade to Ghanaian enterprises. It claimed that there was a strong presence of foreigners in the retail business; this being an issue of 'national security' in a situation of high unemployment among the youth. It cited sub-section 27 of the Ghana Investment Promotion Centre (GIPC) Act 865 which, it said, does not allow foreign nationals to engage in retail business in Ghana. It insisted that just as it was illegal for foreign engagement in small scale mining so was it in retail business.^{xxi}

GUTA was quick to observe that there were some Ghanaians who fronted for foreigners to engage in retail business and urged them to stop the practice while it called on public officials to 'be patriotic and desist from aiding them to acquire the necessary documents to operate'. The Nigerians

had petitioned the Regional Security Council and the Nigerian High Commission in Ghana and claimed that they felt unsafe with their businesses. GUTA claimed this to be false and 'a ploy to distract the appropriate state institutions from acting to address the disturbing takeover of the retail business by foreigners.'^{xxii} It is clear from the Ghana News Agency report that although GUTA claimed that it had nothing against foreigners but was only insisting on the right thing being done it resisted 'the growing involvement and dominance of foreign nationals in retail trade'. This resonates with the sentiments of the upper middle class.

What is instructive about these developments within the middle-classes in general is that there is a certain conception about who is a 'foreigner'. That conception informs trade and industrial competition. At the level of the *upper* middle-class it is not the *presence* of 'the foreigner' that is at stake. It is the discriminatory policies that restrict the reciprocal presence of the 'indigene's' goods and services in the market of the country of origin of 'the foreigner' that are the point of focus.^{xxiii} The Import Prohibition List of Nigeria provides an illustration of such discriminatory policies. In reference to the *lower* middle-class it is not, again, 'the foreign' *presence* which is found worrying but 'the foreign' *domination* of the retail trade that is the point of concern. It is clear that the middle-classes are

concerned with the economic *dominance* by 'the foreigner' through respective States' aggressive policy operation or lack of it.

For the middle classes, therefore, the *micro-state* in Africa is *necessary* for their survival in the intra-Africa market place where they compete with each other. This suggests that processes and drives toward Pan-Africanism are of significance to the middle-classes in Africa – Ghana and Nigeria in particular regarding this case study – *only if* they provide *economic* leverage in their competition over each other; that is, where Pan-Africanism is conceived as the process and drive toward the emergence of a single State, like a People's Republican State of Africa (PRSA), on the continent. If, therefore, a political development towards the realization of the ideals of Pan-Africanism should emerge from the economic activities of the African middle-classes it would not be the product of any *conscious* middle-class activity but an *unconscious* end attained in a convergence of continental economic and political *imperatives*.^{xxiv}

At the core of that convergence are the activities of petty traders and other 'ordinary' people who *depend* on each other across borders and informally conduct themselves as *one people*. In our field research at the Togo-Benin border in the second half of last year, we observed this phenomenon of such petty traders and others universally accepting and conducting their activities in all the currencies of the sub-region as if they were operating within a single national entity. In our interaction with them we heard them

speak with the mentality of 'we are one people'. These are people who are conscious of their different ethnic origins but interact as the people of a country just as people within the same country bearing different ethnic origins do. The atmosphere of friendliness among *such* people bars any xenophobic reactions just as one observes in the city trade centres of Lagos, Porto-Novo, Lomé and Accra.^{xxv}

It seems to us that further research is required on the *tendencies* of these petty traders and 'ordinary people' if we are to deeply appreciate the *dimensions* of those tendencies and their implications for the enhancement of the spirit of Pan-Africanism – even if that currently unfolds in an unconscious framework. The encouragement and deepening of such *voluntary* tendencies among this great mass of the African people appear to us as the definitive bedrock of the development of Pan-Africanism. Whether Pan-Africanism would develop as a capitalist or socialist phenomenon seems to us to be predicated on the role that conscious sections of the African intelligentsia play in the individualist or collectivist conduct of trade and industry at the level of that great mass. Left in the hands of the middle-classes, which find the *functionality* of the *micro-States* as *essential* for their leverage in the intra-class competition, the development of Pan-Africanism as a single State-building process would ominously retard.

4

The Working Classes in the Process of Grassroots Pan-Africanism

In our consideration of the 'ordinary people' above, we are concerned with that mass of Africans who, left unto themselves, take their own decisions for their own development. They, therefore, include the class of peasant farmers as well as all others involved in the informal sectors of the economy. Both in Nigeria and Ghana, however, we observe this other class of 'ordinary people' whose existence is *controlled* by their employers and thus do not participate in the decision-making process affecting them. These are found in the public service and industrial establishments. Virtually regimented in their places of work, these working people have less opportunity to migrate. The literature, however, refers to 'migrant workers'.^{xxvi} They emerge from this same group. Such migrant workers are categorized into *skilled* and *unskilled* workers who move from their countries of origin to seek better conditions of engagement.

It seems to us that *within* the *parameters* of Grassroots Pan-Africanism



migrant workers are more of a dynamic force than those workers constricted within the

micro-states of West Africa in particular and Africa in general. This might seem quite surprising in the face of the understanding that permanently residential and virtually regimented workers constitute a more formidable force among the mass of working people for political change. The insecurity of *migrant* workers in their host countries appears to predispose them to a position of weakness and tendencies of opportunism for self-survival in their new environment. The historical presence of Nigerians in Ghana from the 1920s to 1969 and the impact of those Nigerians on economic development in Nigeria upon their expulsion and return to Nigeria in 1969 tell a different story in West Africa. R. Olaniyi tells the story of returned Nigerians graphically.^{xxvii}

With respect to returned Nigerian traders, who acquired their business expertise during their stay in Ghana,^{xxviii} Olaniyi explains how the returnees impacted on and transformed the entrepreneurial scene in Nigeria. Those returnees, by his narrative, became a sort of yeast that leavened the scene of business activity in Nigeria. It is in this sense that migrant workers tend to be harbingers of Grassroots Pan-Africanism within their host communities in West Africa. Their interactions with indigenes of the host countries tend to dissolve relations of ethnicity or rationalize them through various means including inter-marriages. Here, we concentrate on developments in Ghana and Nigeria whereby Nigerian migrant workers moved to Ghana where they lived and worked between

the 1920s and 1969 and Ghanaian migrant workers moved to Nigeria to live and work there in the 1970s and beyond.

In his narrative, Rasheed Olaniyi musters both documented data and data from interviews with first and second generations of returned Nigerian migrants in Ghana who are now in Nigeria. The first generation, according to him, arrived in Ghana when there was 'free movement of persons across African countries'. These countries exhibited an 'African culture of accommodation and tolerance'. It was within this space of free movement of persons in Africa and in an atmosphere of a culture of accommodation and tolerance that Nigerian migrant labour set out into Ghana. Cocoa production in Ghana, he says, made the country centre of attraction for Yoruba migrants.

In *The Unsettled Relationship: Labour Migration and Economic Development* (edited by Demetrios G. Papademetriou and Philip L. Martin), Aderanti Adepoju contributes Chapter 3, entitled 'Binational Communities and Labour Circulation in Sub-Saharan Africa', where he observes that 'In West Africa, most labor migration can be more correctly regarded as commercial migration and involves both males and females. The case of Nigerians in Ghana prior to 1969 is a case in point.' He adds that 'What began as labor migration to cocoa-growing and lumber areas of Ghana evolved into commercial migration in diamond mining, trading, and commerce.'

Sara Berry, in her *No Condition is Permanent: The Social Dynamics of Agrarian Change in Sub-Saharan Africa*, explains at page 140 that before the First World War there were limited employment opportunities in Southern Nigeria. As such, according to her, 'thousands of Nigerians emigrated to work in the Gold Coast, on cocoa farms as well as in the gold mines and on the railways'. Thus, in the 1920s cocoa farmers in Ghana began to use hired labour and continued doing so during the depression in the 1930s. Olajide Aluko states, however, that *after 1957* Nigerians who went to work in Ghana 'went to towns rather than cocoa farms, and the mines.'^{xxix}

This creates an impression that prior to 1957 Nigerian migrants remained in the extractive industries of agriculture and mines. But Rasheed Olaniyi quotes from M. Peil's 'Ghana's Aliens' as saying that immediately Nigerian 'target workers' got 'a few cedis they go into retail trade and prosper too.' Olaniyi notes Ghanaian curiosity that those 'Yoruba traders arrived (in) Ghana with virtually no capital and subsequently became wealthy.' If that refers to the post-1957 period then he makes us understand that the boom in cocoa sales at that time and the on-going construction works attracted Nigerian migrant workers not only to the towns but to the rural areas for agricultural purposes.



That suggests that the attraction of Nigerian migrant workers to provide what Olaniyi calls 'cheap labour' in agriculture and construction was continual from the First World War period through the railway construction era in the 1920s to the post-independence times. This is reinforced by the fact that Olaniyi informs us that even after the execution of the Aliens Compliance Order of 1969 some second generation Nigerian migrants returned to Ghana to work on *farms*. (See pages 10 and 27, R. Olaniyi). In Olaniyi's terms, these second generation Nigerians had become acculturated with Ghanaian facial marks.

In the 1930s, the Nigerian migrants in the cocoa-growing areas had become a force to reckon with such that some had become cocoa farm *owners* whose activities had attracted the need for the Okyeman, that is, the traditional council of Akyem Abuakwa, to pass a Resolution in 1935 to hold them in check or be deported. (See page 13, Olaniyi). It seems to us that by 1932, following Olaniyi's narrative, the Nigerian migrant workers, who had gone to Ghana to provide 'cheap labour' on cocoa farms 'with virtually no capital', had themselves become cocoa farm *owners*. They were strong enough to 'oppose the cocoa hold-up led by the Okyenhene' of Akyem Abuakwa in that year.

We are here anxious to find out how, in the light of the tight land tenure system, the Nigerian migrant workers were able to transform themselves into farm owners; that is, if they did.^{xxx} In this regard, we appear helped by


Shashi Kolavalli and Marcella Vigneri. In their draft paper *Cocoa in Ghana: Shaping the Success of an Economy*, the authors explain that 'As cocoa establishment also required large investments in labour, *a system of small plots gifts* was also developed to attract workers from other areas.' We vouch on our own encounter in the Eastern Region that this system continues to date. The authors, however, do not mention Nigerian or other migrants as beneficiaries.

W. Quarmine here explains that there are three types of farmers in Ghana: those who own the land as *owner-farmers* and have 40% of their labour hired; those who are *tenant-workers* tied to an *Abunu* land use contract; and those who are *caretakers* held on an *Abusa* land use contract. By these contracts, the former earns half of the crop while the landowner takes the other half as rent. The latter, on the other hand, earns one third while the landlord takes two thirds as rent.^{xxxii} The alternative to these latter, according to Shashi Kolavalli and Marcella Vigneri, is an outright purchase of the land in the case of the owner-farmers. Did the Nigerian migrants take advantage of any of these?^{xxxii}

By saying that the Nigerian migrants' assets in 'cocoa farms were equally confiscated' in the implementation of the Aliens Compliance Order (page 19) Olaniyi suggests that by means of one or more of the avenues for land acquisition in Ghana the Nigerians came to own land. He supports this with his interviews of Alhaji Salimonu Adebisi and Reverend Dr. Bunmi

Olujinmi who separately impressed on him that 'Some Yoruba in Ghana practiced agriculture by planting food crops (page 31)' He also refers to some 'immovable properties' that the Nigerian migrants had to leave behind due to inadequate planning for their sales. These might have included their farms.

The supposition is based on Kojo S. Amanor's statement that in 'Akyem and the Western Region, chiefs sold large areas of land to *migrant cocoa farmers*'. This statement does not specifically refer to *Nigerian migrant cocoa farmers*.^{xxxiii} But Dede Amanor-Wilks, in her *One District One Factory: Some Lessons from the Field*, is specific that there were 'migrant *Krobo* farmers who during the cocoa revolution at the turn of the twentieth century bought land from Akwapim farmers.'^{xxxiv} These Krobo were not migrant *workers*. Nigerian migrant cocoa farmers, apart from the Krobo migrant farmers, could, then, have bought land on which Olaniyi's interviewees grew their various crops.



The implication of all these is that the Nigerian migrant workers in Ghana did not remain complacent as workers with some earnings but moved on with the little they earned

into trading and agricultural investment. The 'African culture of

accommodation and tolerance' certainly facilitated their abode in Ghana to the extent that Olaniyi could observe that 'The Yoruba were (so) highly integrated in the socio-economic and political structure of Ghana that they never envisaged such a sudden deportation' (page 2) in implementation of the Aliens Compliance Order 1969. The import of the Nigerian migrant labour experience is that it had an impact on Grassroots Pan-Africanism in Nigeria.

In this respect, Rasheed Olaniyi puts on record the immense transformation that the Nigerian returnees effected in the socio-economic development of Nigeria in towns like Ogbomoso and Inisa. Not only did the returnees come with traits of Ghanaian culture, like naming and face-marking as well as the associated beliefs, but also more importantly economic skills and enterprise. The whole change of Ogbomoso from an agrarian society to a modern urban entity is attributed by Olaniyi to the enterprise of Nigerian returnees from Ghana. In a word, Olaniyi states, 'Ghanaian food, dressing, personal hygiene has (sic) been promoted in the Yoruba towns of Ogbomoso, Inisa and Oyan.'

No doubt the Nigerian advert above, with meaning in history, states that 'Nigeria and Ghana are the closest of all countries in the world.' Any wonder that during the Nigerian Quit Order in 1983 and 1985 some Ghanaian migrant workers (See picture in the previous paragraph) were

reported to have been protected by their Nigerian neighbours who hid them. We, yours truly, as Ghanaians, were part of that experience.^{xxxv}

We have stated that the voluntary tendencies among the mass of petty traders appear to us as the definitive bedrock of the development of Pan-Africanism. Here, we make haste to add that the experiences and acts of migrant workers in their host country and upon their return to the country of origin additionally reinforce that bedrock. Hence, the free settlement and interaction of people in and from different African countries constitute the fundament of Grassroots Pan-Africanism which in turn serves as the bedrock of Pan-Africanism.

5

In the Performing Arts Industry

Another area that also reflects the contradictory tendencies of *tolerance* and *anxieties* in Ghano-Nigerian relations is the entertainment industry. Here, not only do we observe a healthy panorama of mutual availability of Ghanaian and Nigerian spaces for their artistes in their respective countries as well as *co-operation* of these artistes in *collectively* performing on same stages but also *competition* to monopolise 'the national territory'. On the www.quota.com website this has been referred to by Olaoluwa Akinnsi as 'friendly rivalry' which he defines 'as a

connection shared between people who can't stand each other's guts but don't dislike each other either.'^{xxxvi} It's a nice way of putting it though not diplomatically, for, others on the website confirm it.

The *competitive* angle in the music industry was recently highlighted at the S Concert held at the Accra Sports Stadium on December 2 2017 when Shatta Wale of Ghana talked about 'the invasion of Nigeria music in the country'. The dancehall musician cried out 'Too much Nigeria, too much Nigeria. How many of you wan hear Ghana music alone? You don't like Shatta Wale? You don't like Stonebwoy? You don't like Sarkodie? We too get artistes ooo.'^{xxxvii} That was indicative of the extent of penetration of Nigerian music into the Ghanaian market as it is with video production where Ghanaians fancy Nigerian movies.

Talking about video production, we find collaboration between Ghanaian and Nigerian artistes resulting in collective appearances in 'Ghanaian films' and 'Nigerian films'. Such



collaboration has even led to marriage bonds between the artistes some of which have ended in unhappy breakdowns. And here we also observe anxieties about such marriages. On August 9 2017, GhanaWeb, in reporting Juliet Ibrahim's dating the Nigerian artiste Iceberg Slim (See

picture), had the story entitled as 'Ghanaians blast Juliet Ibrahim for dating "rogue" Nigerian artiste'.^{xxxviii} The relationship was considered as a "step down". She had previously married a Ghanaian car-maker's son, Kwadwo Safo Jnr.

Great attendances at shows performed in Ghana by Nigerian comedians and comediennes suggest the increasing mutual amalgamation of Nigerian and Ghanaian sub-cultures. Ghanaian spontaneous and positive reaction to 'Nigerian jokes' expressed in Nigerian Pidgin English indicates *basic* mutual linguistic and cultural understanding and appreciation among Ghanaians and Nigerians. This *informal* evolution of cultural like-mindedness among them promotes a natural spirit of Grassroots Pan-Africanism as an *inexorable* trend in African society. The arts are bringing African society together in a manner and at a rate that the *formal* political endeavours of African leaders do not match.

6

Ethno-Class Sources of Xenophobia in Ghano-Nigerian Relations



In the face of the aggregate of these centripetal and centrifugal tendencies in Africa's development

process with respect to Ghana-Nigerian relations we are bound to perceive and conceive African society as one in a *transition*. As in all transitions, the current African transition is open to quite opportunistic manipulation by minority interests while their definite opposite tendency of continental patriotic class forces seek to *accelerate* the centripetal dimension in the dialectic. This section focuses on the dynamics of ethno-class forces that drag the African development process in the direction of either *stabilizing* the transition or *arresting* its positive resolution with xenophobic consequences.

Getting into the nitty-gritty of the Ghanaian situation into which Nigerian migrant workers immigrated, Kojo S. Amanor, in his *Rural Youth and the Right to a Livelihood in Ghana*, offers us with a class framework to disentangle the complexities of that situation. Weaving around the *land question* from the end of the 19th Century, that is, before the arrival of the Nigerian migrant workers, Amanor views a tussle between the Chiefs and Elders, on the one hand, and the youth, on the other hand. His construction, from indigenous usage, of a definition for the concept of youth utilizes 'physically active' and 'control of property' as the essential referents. We take liberties to quote him at length:

In Ghana, the concept of youth is closely associated with that of young men (*mmerantee* or *nkwankwaa* in the Akan

dialects). This carries two different connotations. Firstly, it refers to the physically active stratum of the population, the younger people within households, who perform services for elders, who can be sent on errands by elderly people, and who are not in control of property. In the nineteenth century this was the strata of the population who performed military service, were organised into companies, and in peacetime maintained the infrastructure of the settlements, such as roads and sanitation. Secondly, it is used as a class concept to refer to commoners, those people without significant property and significant positions and office in the administration of lineage and state property. Young men, in the Ghanaian context refer to people who can be in their late forties. As a concept, it is more related to notions of economic independence rather than mere physical age.

We are wont to aggregate the meanings of youth above into a youth concept that assumes in its definition “being physically active as well as being without *significant* property”. For, it is implicit in the quote that indigenous usage simultaneously conceives a person without significant property and endowed with physical dynamism as “youth”. It is in this sense that Amanor appears to us to conceive “youth” within the context of indigenous usage as a *class*. That accords with the universally scientific

rendition of 'class' as set in *property relations*. Jean Marie Allman proceeds further to see such youth or youngmen (*nkwankwaa* or *mmerantee*) not in terms of their being 'literally "young"'.

She bases herself on Ivor Wilks' statement that the 19th century *nkwankwaa* were men who 'belonged to old and well-established families but whose personal expectations of succeeding to office or even of acquiring wealth were low'. To her, the term is used in the sense 'that they existed in often uneasy subordination to elder or chiefly authority'. She thinks those Asante youngmen were 'Perhaps best described as an emerging *petite bourgeoisie*, with an economic base in trading and rubber production and economic interests directed at the establishment of free and unencumbered trade with the coast.' Indeed, 'their economic and social base' was 'petit bourgeois'.^{xxxix}

Allman does not identify only the youngmen as a class. She also identifies the *asikafo* (or 'rich men' or 'men of gold') as a 'rising bourgeoisie' as well as the *ahiafo* (the 'poor' or 'under-privileged'). Hence, she observes *four* classes in the Gold Coast (Ghana) *before* the arrival of the Nigerian migrant workers in the first quarter of the 20th Century; that is, 'the chiefs, the *asikafo*, the *nkwankwaa* and the *ahiafo*' who were respectively the *ethnic State*, the *bourgeoisie*, the *petite-bourgeoisie* and the *poor or underprivileged*. She does not find them as 'four neatly packaged social

classes or groups' – they 'were not mutually exclusive'. This refers particularly to the chiefs and *asikafo*.^{x1}

In spite of the non-exclusivity of the classes their differences were sharp enough to engage them in conflict with each other in a situation where fluid alliances were formed against this or that class at one point or the other by the others. That was the *ethno-class environment* in which the Nigerian migrant workers arrived in the first quarter of the 20th Century, prospered and also participated in the system of alliances as it benefitted them but became victims of when they were expelled as ethnic Yoruba once they had their turn at the receiving end of the political economy of that system of alliances. That those Nigerian migrant *workers*, who had *not yet* progressed into the petite-bourgeoisie at the time of the expulsion, were later *allowed* to return to Ghana showed the essential class dynamics as dominated by upper class struggles.

Hence, in this section, we are swayed to show how the ethno-class dynamics, dominated essentially and ultimately by intra-upper class struggles, played out at the level of Grassroots Pan-Africanism in Ghano-Nigerian affairs and how this continues to create aberrations in the respective settlement and free movement of persons and goods within and across African micro-States; that is to say, in spite of the *African culture of accommodation and tolerance* which is still to be found in communities in Africa as a whole – rural as well as urban.

We begin with a brief exploration of the historical landscape of the production relations into which the Nigerian and other migrant workers were to find themselves upon arrival later in Ghana in the first quarter of the 20th Century. To this effect, Jean Marie Allman sees the *nkwankwaa* (youngmen) in Ashanti 'as an emerging petite bourgeoisie with an economic base in trading and rubber production and economic interests directed at the establishment of free and unencumbered trade with the coast'^{xli} in the 19th Century. In the Akuapem and Krobo areas, Amanor sees a 'nobility' which 'had extensive plantations of oil palm which they farmed with slave labour'.^{xlii}

These 'wealthy oil palm producers', Amanor says, 'emerged as secular chiefs replacing a theocratic ruling class in the nineteenth century'. Early in that century they had acquired land by military means for the expansion of the palm plantations but in the mid-century they and the Akuapem purchased land from the neighbouring Akyem chiefs. Gradually, they moved 'into adjacent land through land purchases arranged between chiefs and military generals'.^{xliii} With the collapse of the export palm oil market in the late 19th Century, they turned to the promising production and export of cocoa. New but moist lands had to be bought since oil palm lands were unsuitable.^{xliv}

The lands were bought 'in highly uninhabited wilderness areas' in Akyem with the accumulated considerable profits made in the previous investments in oil palm and rubber collection. In those early days of the cocoa industry, 'labour was a major constraint' but the existence of 'a large pool of indigent labour served to create a labour force' for the development of the plantations. Small plots of land were given out which made the recipients dependent on the large farm owner donors who could ask them for help on their farms. The recipients hired out their labour to such farms to supplement their income. In the 1920s, migrant labour began to migrate into the Akyem cocoa plantations.

These initial migrants, according to Amanor, had followed the early cocoa farmers 'from the same areas in the southeast (of Ghana).' They did not have enough money to purchase land. So, since the Akyem chiefs had taken interest in cocoa cultivation for its value but 'lacked the labour with which to enter into cocoa farming', these less wealthy migrants entered into share contracts with the chiefs. The latter allocated them with land to be cultivated as cocoa plantations with the proceeds being divided into three – one going to the migrant farmer and two going to the chief. Hence, there were not just hired labourers but tenants as well. These and other variations of production relations preceded the arrival of Nigerian and other migrant workers.^{xlv}

Aderanti Adepoju states that some Nigerian migrant workers moved into Ghana in migrations that took 'the form of primary group movement from the same origin'. In such cases, relations among the migrants transmitted messages about the various available opportunities to their hometowns. Others then followed in a chain migration, ultimately. Those migrants later reconstituted themselves 'into homogeneous groups' in Ghana.^{xlvi} This inter-country migration took a pattern of 'rural-rural migration'; that is, migrant labourers from the rural area of a country moved to the rural area of a neighbouring country 'simply as an *extension* across national boundaries of internal movements.' Within Nigeria, there were east-west movements.^{xlvii}

This brings into sharp relief the *ethno-class* configuration of the migrants.

In the words of Rasheed Olaniyi, 'In Ghana, Yoruba promoted their socio-cultural institutions. They lived a Yoruba communal life bonded by kinship and ethnic affinity. Yoruba food, music and



costume were promoted in the diaspora. They maintained trans-territorial links with the homeland for the advantages of long-distance exchanges.^{xlviii} Adepoju does not just see the migrations as 'migrations across national boundaries' but also as a 'free movement of *labour*'.^{xlix} This is not to accord the ethno-class feature to the Yoruba alone since the Igbo

of the same Nigerian stock appeared to spot that feature. Unfortunately, not much is said about the Igbo in the literature.

The ethno-class configuration of the Nigerian migrants was to undergo some degree of differentiation when some of them evolved from migrant workers to wealthy farm owners and traders as well as incorporate Ghanaian elements of culture. Olaniyi thus observes that the 'Yoruba in Ghana was indeed, a *mixed culture* with the experience of cultural transfer.'¹ These differentiations were to define their place in the system of alliances that was to ensure their ultimate expulsion from the country in an *intra*-class struggle that began in 1932 or so.

It is important to emphasize that in the said *intra*-class struggles the Nigerian migrant farm *owners* had emerged from the migrant *workers* who arrived in Ghana in response to what Dede Amanor-Wilks calls 'the cocoa revolution' during which, according to Adepaju in reference to Adomako-Sarfoh, 'the cocoa farms ... increasingly relied on migrant labour to perform the arduous tasks which the *indigenes scorn(ed)*'. During their migrant career *some* of the 'most successful' migrant workers, Adepaju states, 'acquired new skills and experiences and *a certain working capital*.' Subsequently, he adds, 'With the increasing *commercialization of land*, migrant tenant farmers (were) able to consolidate their farm holding from various landlords.'² They bought them.

Aderanti Adepaju significantly observes across the African continent that '... *diversification* of productive activities ... reduces conflicts of interest between natives and migrants thus minimizing tension between them.'^{lii} The rise of the Nigerian farm *owners* in the Ashanti and Eastern Regions of Ghana from the Nigerian migrant *labourers* within the Ghanaian native landscape changed the dynamics of relations that had hitherto subsisted between Ghanaian large farm owners and the Nigerians in general and specifically the new Nigerian *owners*. The diversification had been obstructed through Nigerian labour dynamism and Ghanaian scorn of arduous tasks which had previously called for the engagement of Nigerian and other regional labourers like the Mossi.

Rasheed Olaniyi, as already observed above, reports the *seething tension* that set in between Ghanaian and Nigerian cocoa farm *owners* when 'In 1932 the Nigerian cocoa farmers in Akyem Abuakwa opposed the local cocoa hold-up led by Okyenhene. It was claimed that some of the Nigerian farmers had supported the predatory European firms against the natives.'^{liii} In 1931, the population of Nigerians in Ghana was 57,400. It was to rise to 191,802 in 1960, Olaniyi adds. He also points out that 'Cocoa became the salient element in the capitalist-generated social transformation, ethnicity and political alliances.'^{liv} Hence, out of their

engagement in the cocoa industry the Yoruba saw their commercial profile rise in suspected domination over the Kwahu's profile.^{lv}

In the wake of the rise in the ethno-class position of some Nigerians in Ghana they were not only respected but also confronted with the indignation of Ghanaian traders of the Kwahu stock with whom they competed. The situation alarmed Okyeman, the traditional council of Akyem Abuakwa, to the point that in 1935 it passed a Resolution against the implicit 'insubordination' of 'foreigners' who 'should be made amenable to the customary laws of the various states in which they reside' – barring that it called on the colonial administration to sanction their *deportation* as punishment.^{lvi} The wording of the Resolution hid the acts of unbearable taxation that Okyeman imposed on the youngmen (petite-bourgeoisie) and the Nigerian farm owners and traders.

Amanor here states that 'The chiefs frequently found many ways of raising revenues from their "subjects", which produced considerable resentment among the population. In the Akyem area during the 1920s and 1930s, there was considerable unrest among youth, and local youth organised *alongside migrants* to oppose chiefs.'^{lvii} This *collective* resistance by the Ghanaian and Nigerian petite-bourgeoisie against the chiefly ruling class, which doubles in some cases as part of the bourgeois class categorized by Allman, emphasizes the *essential* class character of the conflicts. We have

already pointed out that even before the arrival of the Nigerians the Ghanaian petite-bourgeoisie was in such tussles against the chiefs some of whom they eventually destooled.

This is how, in the case of Ashanti, Jean Marie Allman describes the situation:

Perhaps best described as an emerging petite bourgeoisie, with an economic base in trading and rubber production and economic interests directed at the establishment of free and unencumbered trade with the coast, the *nkwankwaa*, according to Wilks, probably acquired 'their first experience of political action in the anti-war and anti-conscription movements' of the late 1860s and early 1870s. It was in the 1880s, however, that the *nkwankwaa* made their first serious bid for political power in Asante. It was the Kumase *nkwankwaa* who, angered when Asantehene Mensa Bonsu raised taxes and imposed heavy fines for petty offenses, took a leading role in the movement which eventually overthrew the Asantehene in 1883.^{lviii}

In the 1920s and 1930s, these struggles continued with the Nigerians fused in.

In those 20th Century developments, Allman describes the contemporary scene in similar terms as she goes further to state that

With their social and economic position bolstered by the growth in trade and the spread of education, the *nkwankwaa* became more resentful of the powers exercised by the chiefs, namely their ability to levy taxes and impose communal labor requirements. In 1930, the *nkwankwaa* were particularly outraged by news that the Kumasihene, Nana Prempe I, and his chiefs were considering a law which would require that a percentage of a deceased person's property be given to the Kumasihene and his chiefs. In a letter to the Chief Commissioner, they warned that it was a similar measure which led to the overthrow of Mensa Bonsu in 1883. After discussions with the Chief Commissioner, Nana Prempe I dropped the issue.^{lix}

By belabouring the *essential* class character of developments in Ghana *before* and *after* the Nigerian arrivals we have been anxious to burst the *ethnic* shell as the fundamental determinant in social conflicts at the time and now.

The chiefs' sale of land in the Ashanti, Western and Eastern Regions to both indigenous farmers, like the Krobo, and successful Nigerian migrant workers, who then became farm owners, deprived the *nkwankwaa* (youngmen or petite-bourgeoisie) of land which they claimed access to as a familial right. In this regard, Kojo S. Amanor explains the dynamics of denial of land to the youth. He traces the development to the shrinking of frontier lands. He states that 'the influx of migrants resulted in the rapid alienation of land and a process of land accumulation' whereby 'in some areas, such as Akyem and the Western Region, chiefs sold large areas of land to migrant cocoa farmers.' In the process, 'Large farmers and elders could also accumulate large areas of land for their own personal investment, hire migrant labour to work these lands, or place them under migrant sharecropping tenants.'^{lx}

According to Amanor, this process led to the youth's experience of land shortage to which they 'responded by opposing the chiefs, *or by developing anti-migrant sentiments*'. In fact, he adds that in 'the Akyem area, from as early as the late nineteenth century, youth responded to land sales by "destooling" (dethroning) chiefs'.^{lxi} Hence, land sales were a constant source of discord between the youth and the chiefs *before* the arrival of the Nigerian and other migrant workers. But the migrant

farmers to whom the chiefs had 'alienated land' were not left to themselves; they were subjected to continual 'increasing exactions' against which they resisted. To check this resistance, the chiefs manipulated and mobilized the youth to 'expel the migrants' for their supposed encroachment in 'areas not allocated to them' and thus 'abused the hospitality extended to them.' Amanor sees these accusations as a 'guise'.^{lxii}

Among the Asante, Allman says in a footnote at page 8 that 'it is difficult not only to pinpoint the nkwankwaa's origins in time but to examine *their specific social and economic grievances*.' All the same, she points out that in the 1880s they were not happy with the then Asantehene's tax and heavy fines impositions to the extent that they 'took a leading role in the movement which eventually overthrew the Asantehene in 1883' and being "unconvinced of the virtues of a monarchical system", they were able to bring Kumase under a "republican form of government" or a "Council of commoners and chiefs", albeit for only a brief period.' (p. 7-8). As a class 'with an economic base in trading and rubber production and economic interests directed at the establishment of free and unencumbered trade with the coast', like the wealthy Krobo in the mid-19th Century, they sought to replace and take over the State.

Allman portrays these youngmen in Ashanti as the mobilizing force in that area of Ghana, and who, like the Akyem petite-bourgeoisie, could be set up to do the bidding of the very chiefs they had been opposing. This occurrence, she explains, stems from their ideological imperative to the effect that they believed 'that the support of the chiefs was an ideological necessity: the chiefs would bring with them the support of the spirits and ancestors of the entire (Asante) nation' (p. 11). Hence, in their struggles with the Asantehene in the 19th and 20th Centuries they relied on this or those chiefs to fight their battles. Thus, in the wake of the consolidation of the Asante ruling class, they could do nothing; for, they exhibited 'impotence as a class'. They were only youngmen with 'potency as catalysts, ideologues and rabble-rousers'. (p. 16). This set disposition made them support and go against the CPP and also tolerate Kumasi as 'a replica of "Ogbomoso abroad"' but later chase out the Nigerians.

Hence, for a variety of reasons the youth or petite-bourgeoisie, as defined here, became the means, in their fleeting tendencies, to be used by the ruling classes on the backs of ethno-class imperatives in Ghana to inaugurate the first major xenophobic altercation in Ghano-Nigerian relations. The apparent backlash by Nigeria in 1983/85 was followed by the movement of Nigerian capital to Ghana in dominance. The cries against 'Ghana as The 37th State of Nigeria' now very well reflect, once again, the dominance of Nigerian capital in Ghana just as it was in the

1930s, 1950s and 1960s. Those cries are a poor imitation in expectancy of the inhumane State policies of 1969, 1983 and 1985 that violated the essential African culture of accommodation and tolerance of any human being in our dear midst. Xenophobia is certainly not an historical African trait but an aberration emerging from *intra-bourgeois class struggles* within Grassroots Pan-Africanism that find a clear expression in State policies.

The implications of the above suggest the need for a pedagogical imperative that brings African institutions of study into close interaction with the populace for the construction and direction of an African society that understands and shuns all xenophobic tendencies. *That is, as a matter of course.* (See the adjacent image of the authors and some migrants after a February 10



2018 interaction of the authors with the migrants who have lived in Ghana since 1956) Such a non-xenophobic spirit already pertains among Africans at the borders of these micro-States. The point is to nurture it further within African cultural practice in general and in specific nullification of the adverse effects of these artificial borders on the process of Pan-

Africanism – an integration of Africans across the continent and beyond. The answer to the question of how to derive our knowledge of Africanness from persons at the grassroots of African society and impart same to them thus resides in this interaction between institutions of study and the populace. It's a firm and systematic downward reintegration of the Ivory Tower.

Conclusions

In this paper, we have tried to chart out the complex pattern of production relations within which Ghano-Nigerian interaction play out. In this context, we sought to make Ghana the primary playing ground and concentrated on the evolutionary structuring of production relations there to explain the nature of the kind of interaction that took place in that country in the 20th Century and its continued development in the 21st. In this way, we observed the pull factors that sent Nigerian *migrant workers* to Ghana to engage in cocoa production virtually without capital and where they were able to generate working capital that enabled them move into commercial and other activities. Similarly, we saw a process of *direct capital movement* from Nigeria to Ghana from the last quarter of the 20th Century. This has generated capital competition in Ghana.

In the circumstance, we observed a seething xenophobia between the two countries generated and led by the Ghanaian and Nigerian owners of capital as one that traces its origin from this general context of capital accumulation and movement within and between them. Situating the seething xenophobia within the mode of capital dynamics in and between the two West African countries impressed on us therein sets of contradictory tendencies of *tolerance* and *anxiety* among West Africans at the grassroots level in a general atmosphere of traditional African culture of accommodation and tolerance. It is these movements in African society that further impressed on us the need to restructure the existing pedagogy on the continent to bring our educational institutions in interaction with the grassroots to better trail Africa's dynamics.

It is in order at this stage to point out a few shortcomings of this paper for later redress. Our making Ghana the primary playing ground for exhibiting the nature of the interaction between Ghana and Nigeria denied the reader an insight into the pattern of production relations in *Nigeria* that created the *push factors* for its *migrant workers* and later its *capital* to take flight to Ghana. If we had charted out the pattern of those production relations in Nigeria we would have been able to better explain in graphic terms how a reverse movement of migrant workers from Ghana

to Nigeria occurred. That would have explained why the Ghanaian action of 1969 was matched in general *outlines* by the Nigerian actions of 1983 and 1985. The dynamics are similar even in *content*.

Another strategic shortcoming of this paper relates to the position and role of women in the production process in Africa. We cannot take refuge in the fact that existing material on the subject is either limited or scattered. It was our duty to address this limitation during our fieldwork. We only plead resource inadequacy, coupled with the very scattered nature of the material found in *peripheral* references in the general texts, as the source of our predicament. This relegation of the position and role of women to virtual footnotes in the study of migration issues requires stringent condemnation as one of revulsion requiring redress. Such defect in our study of migration in Africa requires the involvement of female researchers to deepen our perspective in that area.

Finally, Pan-Africanism without reference to the Diaspora is surely no Pan-Africanism; but here, from the very onset, we stated our limited concern with intra-regional migration issues. We are gratified, however, by the extenuating circumstance that references in the end notes attached below contain much of the story that we would have had to tell and that a diligent study of them would help fill in the gaps left here. This does not dissuade the reader from going beyond the list here since other

unreferenced materials exist for additional information. Despite all this, we can only hope that this paper fosters another perspective to migration studies in Africa for the appreciation of the dynamics underlining Grassroots Pan-Africanism and its seething xenophobic holdups.

END NOTES

ⁱ Rasheed Olaniyi, in his *The 1969 Ghana Exodus: Memory and Reminiscences of Yoruba Migrants*, quotes an Economic Commission of Africa publication as stating that 'The coming of independence changed the pattern of migration by reducing free international movements by the elaborate development of visa and passport regulations, or customs and controls, of the need for foreign workers to obtain work permits, or restrictions on the repatriation of savings.'

ⁱⁱ Atlas on Regional Integration in West Africa, *Migration*, p. 21. In fact, in his paper *Migration in West Africa*, p. 4, Aderanti Adepoju mentions a previous expulsion in 1958 from Côte D'Ivoire together with others in Chad, Sierra Leone, Cameroon and Zaire.

ⁱⁱⁱ Ogyam Mensah, *Ghana: The 37th State of Nigeria in the Making?* www.Ghanaweb.com September 8 2017. Mensah refers to one Tunde without an address. Akpah Prince's article below (iv) confirms some of his projections, at least.

iv See Ikaweba Bunting, *The Nation-State in Africa as the Problem – In Search of a New Africa*, <https://consciencism.wordpress.com/history/the-nation-state-in-africa-as-the-problem/> See also the chapter '4.2 Migrations Shaping African History', in the book *The Age of Migrations*, written by Stephen Castles, Hein De Haas and Mark J. Miller, [www.age-of-migrations.com>casestudies](http://www.age-of-migrations.com/casestudies).

v Our intention here stands as a diametric opposite to what the book *The Age of Migrations* does by focusing on *international migrations* which are therein implicitly construed as migrations between Africa as a single entity and countries outside that continent. (See Chapter 1, p. 7, of the book) We focus on *intra-Africa* migrations within which we are concerned with immigration and emigration from one section of the continent to the other.

vi It is interesting that what we consider as formal and informal here are appreciated by Yamoah *et al* as *formal and informal institutions* in these terms: 'formal institutions exhibit a hierarchy: from constitutions, to statute and common laws, to specific byelaws, and finally to individual contracts. Boland (1992) and Hodgson (1993) on the other hand, called these "concrete or hard institutions". For informal institutions, North (2005) defined them as code of conduct, norm of behaviour, and conventions – all these emanating generally from a society's culture. These are mechanisms, which run in tandem with formal institutions serving as

tools for solving coordination problems. These informal institutions (sometimes referred to as “consensus institutions”) have arisen to coordinate “repeated human interaction” and more specifically consisting of: extensions, elaborations, and modifications of formal rules, socially sanctioned norms of behaviour, and internally enforced standards of conduct (Boland, 1992; Fiori, 2002; Hodgson, 1993). Studying the impact of socio-cultural factors on entrepreneurship development in Ghana, Baume (1996) noted that, well intentioned programmes and inducement schemes may not be responded to by the general population due to negative effects of certain socio-cultural values and institutions. Drawing lessons from the above discussions, it is evident that, the concept of institution goes beyond physical establishments but also includes the socio-cultural *practices* of a given society.’ See Yamoah *et al* p.30 below. Emphasis added.

vii Rasheed Olaniyi, in his paper quoted above, explains the Yoruba presence in Ghana in these terms from the 1920s to the post-Nigerian Civil War period in the 1960s and 1970s.

viii Akpah Prince, *Top Nigerians Ruling Ghana Economically*, GhanaWeb, January 11

2015 <http://mobile.ghanaweb.com./GhanaHomePage/features/Top-Nigerians-Ruling-Ghana-Economically-342119>; see also Pulse List: Top Nigerians Ruling Ghana Economy <http://www.pulse.com.gh> January 11

2015; or <http://ghanagist.com/must-read-top-nigerians-ruling-ghana-economically/> January 7 2015

ix Yamoah Emmanuel Erastus, Arthur Stephen and Issaka Abdullai, 'Institutional Framework for Promoting Small and Medium Scale Enterprises in Ghana: Perspective of Entrepreneurs', *Australian Journal of Business and Management Research Vol. 3 No.10 [28-45]* January-2014, quote a source (E. J. Villars), writing in 2002, and note that 'less than 5% of large businesses in Ghana are Ghanaian owned.'

x Joseph Kobla Wemakor, *Proliferation of Nigerian Banks Into Ghana Worrying*, NewsGhana, August 12 2014, <https://www.newsghana.com.gh/proliferation-nigerian-banks-ghana-worrying/>

xi Myjoyonline, <https://www.myjoyonline.com/business/2017/august-14th/seven-more-banks-deemed-distressed.php>

xii Ibid

xiii Daily Graphic, January 19 2008, *Nigerian Banks Find Doing Business In Ghana Good To Resist*

xiv See the article *Nigerian Banks Need N42bn to Operate in Ghana*, February 9 2009, <https://www.modernghana.com./news/201883/nigerian-banks-need-n42bn-to-operate-in-ghana.html>, for an idea of the minimum capital

requirement (N7.4 billion) to enable a Nigerian bank to operate in Ghana (2009) as against N25 billion in Nigeria.

^{xv} See *The Ecobank Story* where it is stated that ‘The pieces of an early Ecobank concept began to fall into place at a meeting of the Federation of West African Chambers of Commerce in Mali in 1972. Members at the meeting began to debate the idea of a private sector institution that would help facilitate trade in the sub-region.’ It also states that ‘Ecobank was born out of an exchange of views and ideas among West African businessmen who were determined to provide their continent with a home-grown financial institution.’

<https://www.ecobank.com/group/about-us/the-ecobank-story>

^{xvi} Basiru Adam, *Should Ghana close-up to make Nigeria open-up?*,

February 17 2016, B&FT Online,

<http://thebftonline.com/business/economy/17386/should-ghana-close-up-to-make-Nigeria-open-up-.html>

^{xvii} Bolaji Okusaga, *The Story of South African Businesses in Nigeria*, May

3, 2015, African Business Forum

<http://www.africabusinessforum.com/seeing-value-where-others-see-challenges/>. Interestingly, this article resonates as a Nigerian complaint

against South African business practice in Nigeria just as Ogyam Mensah’s

Ghana: The 37th State of Nigeria in the Making? and Akpah Prince’s *Top*

Nigerians Ruling Ghana Economically resonate as Ghanaian complaint

against Nigerian business practice in Ghana. The complaints are

essentially of the same content. It is also interesting that all such writers do not complain against Morocco. Their complaints are a pressure to open up the African market to the mutual benefit of the African middle classes – which amounts to an *unconscious* surge for an integrated African economy, a prime condition for Pan-Africanism. In fact, on his part, Bolaji Okusaga makes references to ‘economic pan-Africanism’.

xviii Ibid

xix Research writers have taken notice of the propensity of Nigerian capital to avoid risk. Yamoah et al. (ibid) refer to this as ‘the risk-averse behaviour of Nigerian banks’. South African capital is rather aggressive in this respect.

xx The Henry Omenogor’s School of Baking,

<http://www.startyourownbizmag.com/2015/08/Doing-Business-in-Ghana-As-a-Nigerian.html?m=1>

xxi Ghana News Agency(GNA)

<http://www.ghanabusinessnews.com/2017/08/23/guta-denies-threatening-to-take-over-nigerian-businesses/>

xxii Ibid

xxiii A similar situation holds between Nigeria and South Africa where Nigeria complains. See Bolaji Okusaga, *op. cit.*

^{xxiv} Rasheed Olaniyi, in his referenced paper, dilates on the disruptive challenges that proto-nationalism poses to the enterprise of Pan-Africanism.

^{xxv} In our *Report on Research Journey to Togo, July 26 2017*, we observed after our interview with a petty trader called Ablah thus: 'Ablah did not appear to see Nigerians, Beninese, Togolese and Ghanaians as *essentially* different people when she exclaimed 'We are one people'. It was all as if, in her horizons, these "nationalities" were "ethnicities" within one country. That was when she was informed that a single currency for West Africa as a whole was on the drawing board. From these pedagogical reactions of Ablah we could perceive an unravelled spirit of a Pan-African nature at its level of spontaneity.'

^{xxvi} Phyllis Asare, *Labour Migration in Ghana*, Friedrich Egbert Stiftung, (2012) [library.fes.de>pdf-files>bueros>ghana](http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/ghana)

^{xxvii} Rasheed Olaniyi, op.cit.

^{xxviii} Rasheed Olaniyi, op.cit.

^{xxix} Olajide Aluko, *Ghana and Nigeria 1957-70: A Study in Inter-African Discord* p. 68

^{xxx} In fact, there is a single reference to Nigerian 'cocoa farm owners', 'cocoa farmland owners' and 'alien farm labourers' at page 5 of John Alaosebikan Aremu's and Theresa Adeyinka Ajayi's 'Expulsion of Nigerian Immigrant Community from Ghana in 1969: Causes and Effects' in

Developing Country Studies, ISSN 2224-607X (Paper) ISSN 2225-0565
(Online), Vol. 4, No. 10, 2014

^{xxxii} W. Quarmin, 'Incentive for cocoa bean production in Ghana: Does quality matter?' in *NJAS - Wageningen Journal of Life Sciences*
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.njas.2012.06.009>.

^{xxxiii} J. Adomako-Sarfoh suggests the Abusa system to have been used in respect of the migrant worker. See his 'The Effects of the Expulsion of Migrant Workers on Ghana's economy, with Particular Reference to the Cocoa Industry', *Amin S, ed. Modern migrations in Western Africa*. London, Oxford Univ. Press, 1974. 138-55, where while he discusses an effect on the cocoa industry due to the expulsion of migrant cocoa farm labourers he comments on what he calls the 'abusa men' thus: 'The study tended to confirm the extent to which the cocoa farmer has depended on the work of aliens. It is true that as far as the employment of "abusa" (the abusa laborer is paid 1/3 share of the value of all the cocoa plucked in each cocoa season) men is concerned, the problem of replacement has not been very serious, they have become scarce. Where only a fraction of the original abusa men are now working on the farms, the fear exists that efficiency may be impaired and that the level of production affected. Many Ghanaian farm workers are not prepared to serve in these capacities and this fact is likely to result in an additional increase in the cost of establishing farms. If this situation continues, it may lead to a decline in

the cocoa industry.' The implication that migrant workers were employed as 'abusa men' is clear.

xxxiii Kojo S. Amanor, *Rural Youth and the Right to a Livelihood in Ghana*, (2006), p. 5,

www.researchgate.net/publication/255647289 RURAL YOUTH AND THE RIGHT A LIVELIHOOD IN GHANA

xxxiv Dede Amanor-Wilks, *One District One Factory: Lessons from the Field* (2017), <https://acetforafrica.org/highlights/one-district-one-factory-some-lessons-from-the-field/>

xxxv Answers to the question 'Why do Ghanaians hate Nigerians?' on the following website are indicative of the warmth between Ghanaians and Nigerians in their relations - an interesting read: <https://www.quota.com/Why-do-Ghanaians-hate-Nigerians>

xxxvi *ibid*

xxxvii www.ghbase.com/get-ebony-will-chop-falaaaa-shatta-wale-confesses-s-concert-video/?amp_markup=1

xxxviii

<https://mobile.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/entertainment/Ghanaia/ns-blast-Juliet-Ibrahim-for-dating-rogue-Nigerian-artiste-567750>

xxxix Jean Marie Allman, The Youngmen and the Porcupine: Class, Nationalism and Asante's Struggle for Self-Determination, 1954-57, *The Journal of African History*, Vol. 31, No. 2 (1990), pp. 263-279, Cambridge University Press, URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/182768>

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^{xl} In Allman's own words: 'This is not to suggest that in the Asante of the 1950s there were four neatly packaged social classes or groups - the chiefs, the *asikafo*, the *nkwankwaa* and the *ahiafo*. The categories were not mutually exclusive, particularly with reference to the chiefs and the 'big men' or *asikafo*. Many chiefs, particularly the Kumase Divisional Chiefs (*nsafohene*), were wealthy landowners with an economic base in cocoa, transport and trading. At the same time, many of the *asikafo* aspired to traditional office and much of their wealth and power depended on maintaining a close relationship with, and courting the favours of, the traditional ruling powers. In an article dealing with wealth and political power in the nineteenth century, but with applicability to the twentieth century, Wilks notes that 'the analytically distinct categories of the office holders (*amansohwefo*) and the wealthy (*asikafo*) are, in terms of actual membership, largely overlapping ones; that is, office holders became wealthy through the exercise of their office, and persons of wealth acquired office through the use of their money'. Wilks, 'The Golden Stool', 17 and *passim*.'

^{xli} Jean Marie Allman, *op. cit*, p. 7

^{xlii} Kojo Sebastian Amanor, *Family values, Land Sales and Agricultural Commodification in Ghana* (2006), p. 2

^{xliii} *Ibid*

^{xliv} *Ibid*. p. 3

^{xlv} Ibid p. 4

^{xlvi} Aderanti Adepoju, 'Migrations and Socio-Economic Change in Africa', Rural-Urban Articulations, *International Social Science Journal*, Vol. XXXI, No. 2, 1979, p. 209. Published quarterly by UNESCO.

^{xlvii} Ibid. Italics added.

^{xlviii} Rasheed Olaniyi, op. cit, p. 27

^{xlix} Aderanti Adepoju, op. cit, p. 210. Italics added.

^l Rasheed Olaniyi, op. cit, p. 27

^{li} Aderanti Adepoju, op. cit, p. 216. Italics added.

^{lii} Ibid p. 215. Italics added.

^{liii} Rasheed Olaniyi, op. cit, p. 13

^{liv} Ibid

^{lv} Ibid. p. 9

^{lvi} Ibid. p. 13

^{lvii} Kojo S. Amanor, op. cit, pp. 7-8 Italics added.

^{lviii} Jean Marie Allman, op. cit, p. 7

^{lix} Ibid p. 8

^{lx} Kojo Sebastian Amanor, *Family values, Land Sales and Agricultural Commodification in Ghana* (2006), p. 5

^{lxi} Ibid All italics added.

^{lxii} Ibid p. 6